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Abstract
Software watermarking involves embedding a unique identifier or, equivalently, a watermark value within a soft-
ware to prove owner’s authenticity and thus to prevent or discourage copyright infringement. Towards the embed-
ding process, several graph theoretic watermarking algorithmic techniques encode the watermark values as graph
structures and embed them in application programs. Recently, we presented an efficient codec system for encod-
ing a watermark number w as a reducible permutation graph F [pi∗] through the use of self-inverting permutations
pi∗. In this paper, we propose a dynamic watermarking model, which we call WaterRPG, for embedding the
watermark graph F[pi∗] into an application program P. The main idea behind the proposed watermarking model
is a systematic use of appropriate calls of specific functions of the program P. More precisely, for a specific input
Ikey of the program P, our model takes the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of P and the watermark graph F [pi∗],
and produces the watermarked program P∗ having the following key property: its dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey)
is isomorphic to the watermark graph F [pi∗]. Within this idea the program P∗ is produced by only altering ap-
propriate calls of specific functions of the input application program P. We have implemented our watermarking
model WaterRPG in real application programs and evaluated its functionality under various and broadly used
watermarking assessment criteria. The evaluation results show that our model efficiently watermarks Java ap-
plication programs with respect to several watermarking metrics like data-rate, bytecode instructions overhead,
resiliency, time and space efficiency. Moreover, the embedded watermarks withstand several software obfuscation
and optimization attacks.
Keywords: Software protection, watermarking, self-inverting permutations, reducible permutation graphs, dy-
namic call-graphs, graph embedding, codec algorithms, implementation, evaluation, attacks.
1 Introduction
The rapid growth of World Wide Web users, the ease of distributing fast and in the original form digital content
through internet, as well as the lack of technical measures to assure the intellectual property right of owners, has
led to an increment in copyright infringement. Digital watermarking is a technique for protecting the intellectual
property of any digital content, i.e., image, audio, video, software, text, ect. The main idea of digital watermarking
is the embedding of a unique identifier into the digital content through the introduction of errors not detectable by
human perception [11, 16]. Although digital watermarking has made considerable progress and become a popular
technique for copyright protection of multimedia information [16], research on software watermarking has recently
received sufficient attention.
Software Watermarking. Software watermarking is a technique that is currently being studied to prevent or
discourage software piracy and copyright infringement. The software watermarking problem can be described as
the problem of embedding a structure w into a program P and, thus, producing a new program Pw, such that w
can be reliably located and extracted from Pw even after Pw has been subjected to code transformations such as
translation, optimization and obfuscation [23]. More precisely, given a program P, a watermark w, and a key k, the
software watermarking problem can be formally described by the following two functions: embed(P,w,k) → Pw
and extract(Pw,k)→ w.
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There are two main categories of software watermarking techniques namely static and dynamic [12]. A static
watermark w is embedded inside program code in a certain format and it does not change during the program
execution. On the other hand, a dynamic watermark w is encoded in a data structure built at runtime (i.e., during
program execution), perhaps only after receiving a particular input Ikey; it might be retrieved from the watermarked
program Pw by analyzing the data structures built when program Pw is running on input Ikey. Moreover, depend-
ing on the behavioral properties of the embedded watermark w, software watermarking techniques can also be
divided into other categories namely robust and fragile, visible and invisible, blind and informed, focus and spread
spectrum; further discussion on the above software watermarking classification issues can be found in [17, 22, 29].
Graph-based Codecs and Attacks. Recently, several software watermarking systems (or, equivalently, models)
have been appeared in the literature that take or encode watermarks as graph structures and embed them into
application programs. In general, such a graph-based software watermarking model mainly consists of two codec
algorithms: an encoding algorithm which embeds a graph G which represents a watermark w into an application
program P resulting thus the watermarked program Pw, i.e., embed(P,G,k)→ Pw, and a decoding algorithm which
extracts the graph G from Pw, i.e., extract(Pw,k) → G; we usually call the pair (embed,extract)G as graph
codec model and the embedding and extracting algorithms as codec or watermarking algorithms.
Having designed a software watermarking algorithm, it is very important to evaluate it under various assess-
ment criteria in order to gain information about its practical behavior [9]; the most valuable and broadly used
criteria can be divided into two main categories: (i) performance criteria (e.g., data-rate, time and space overhead,
part protection, stealth, credibility), and (ii) resilience criteria (e.g., resistance against obfuscation, optimization,
language-transformation) [13, 23]. We mention that the performance criteria measure the behavior of the water-
marked program Pw and the quality and effectiveness of the embedded watermark w, while the resilience criteria
measure the robustness and resistance of the embedded watermark w against malicious user attacks.
From a graph-theoretical and practical point of view, we are interested in finding a class of graphs G having
appropriate graph properties, e.g., graphs G ∈ G should contain nodes with small outdegree so that matching real
program graphs, and developing software watermarking models (embed,extract)G which meet both:
• high performance: both programs, the original P and the watermarked Pw, have almost identical execution
behavior, almost same size and similar codes; and
• high resiliency: the algorithm extract() is insensitive to small changes of Pw caused by various attacks, that
is, if G ∈ G represents the watermark w and extract(Pw,k)→ w then extract(P′w,k)→ w with P′w ≈ Pw.
Related Work. The most important software watermarking algorithms currently available in the literature are
based on several techniques, among which the register allocation [25], spread-spectrum [31], opaque predicate [1],
abstract interpretation [15], dynamic path techniques [8], code re-orderings [27]; see also [11] for an exposition of
the main results. It is worth noting that many algorithmic techniques on software watermarking have also received
patent protection. [14, 17, 20, 26].
The patent of Davidson and Myhrvold [17] presents the first published static software watermarking algorithm,
which embeds the watermark into a program by reordering the basic blocks of a control flow-graph; note that a
static watermark is stored inside programs’ code in a certain format and it does not change during the programs’
execution. Based on this idea, Venkatesan, Vazirani and Sinha [29] proposed the first graph-based software water-
marking algorithm which embeds the watermark by extending a method’s control flow-graph through the insertion
of a directed subgraph; it is also a static algorithm called VVS or GTW. In [29], the construction of the directed
watermark graph G is not discussed. Collberg et al. [10] proposed an implementation of GTW, which they call
GTWsm, and it is the first publicly available implementation of the algorithm GTW. In GTWsm the watermark is
encoded as a reducible permutation graph (or, for short, RPG) [9], which is a reducible control flow-graph with
a maximum out-degree of two, mimicking real code. Note that, for encoding integers the GTWsm method uses
only those permutations that are self-inverting. The first dynamic watermarking algorithm CT was proposed by
Collberg and Thomborson [12]; it embeds the watermark through a graph structure which is built on a heap at
runtime.
Several software watermarking algorithms have been appeared in the literature that encode watermarks as graph
structures [9, 10, 17, 29]. Recently, Chroni and Nikolopoulos extended the class of software watermarking codec
algorithms and graph structures by proposing efficient and easily implemented algorithms for encoding numbers as
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Models’ Properties WaterRPG’s Properties
static - dynamic dynamic (execution trace)
robust - fragile robust
visible - invisible invisible
blind - informed blind
focus - spread spectrum spread spectrum
Table 1: General properties of watermarking models and the properties of our WarerRPG model.
reducible permutation flow-graphs (RPG) through the use of self-inverting permutations (or, for short, SiP). More
precisely, they have presented an efficient method for encoding first an integer w as a self-inverting permutation pi∗
and then encoding pi∗ as a reducible permutation flow-graph F [pi∗] [4]; see also [5]. The watermark graph F [pi∗]
incorporates properties capable to mimic real code, that is, it does not differ from the graph data structures built by
real programs. Moreover, the structural properties of F [pi∗] cause it resilient to edge, node and label modification
attacks. Note that, the main idea of our dynamic watermarking model proposed in this work initially presented by
Chroni and Nikolopoulos in [6]; see also [2, 3].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a dynamic watermarking model, which we call WaterRPG, for
embedding the watermark graph F [pi∗] into an application program P resulting thus the watermarked program
P∗. The main idea behind the proposed watermarking model is a systematic modification of appropriate function
calls of the program P, through the use of control statements and opaque predicates, so that the execution of the
watermarked program P∗ with a specific input gives a dynamic call-graph from which the watermark graph F [pi∗]
can be easily constructed. More precisely, for a specific input Ikey of a given program P, our model takes the
dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of P and the watermark graph F [pi∗], and produces the watermarked program P∗ so
that the following key property holds: the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) of P∗ with input Ikey is isomorphic to the
watermark graph F [pi∗]. Within this idea the program P∗ is produced by only altering appropriate calls of specific
functions of the input program P and manipulating the execution flow of P∗ by including these altered function calls
into control statements using opaque predicates. In the resulting watermarked program P∗, the control statements
are executed following specific and well-defined execution rules and offer high functionality of P∗. Indeed, our
model achieves low time and space overhead and ensures correctness, that is, T (P, I)≈ T (P∗, I), S(P, I)≈ S(P∗, I),
and O(P, I) = O(P∗, I) for every input I, where T (), S(), and O() are the execution time, the heap space, and the
output of P or P∗ with input I.
We have implemented our watermarking model WaterRPG on Java application programs downloaded from
a free non commercial game database, and evaluated its performance under various and commonly used water-
marking evaluation criteria. In particular, we selected a number of Java application programs and watermarked
them using two main approaches: (i) the straightforward or naive approach, and (ii) the stealthy approach. The
naive approach watermarks a given program P using the well-defined call patterns of our model, while the stealthy
approach watermarks P using structural and programming properties of the code.
The evaluation results show the efficient functionality of all the Java programs P∗ watermarked under both the
naive and stealthy cases. The experiments also show that the watermarking approaches supported by our model can
help develop efficient watermarked Java programs with respect to time and space overhead, credibility, stealthiness,
and other watermarking metrics. Moreover, our WaterPRG model incorporates properties which cause it resilient
to several watermark and code attacks.
Table 1 summarizes the most important general properties, in complementary or opposite pairs, of a software
watermarking model and shows the properties of our WarerRPG model. Throughout the paper, for a given program
P we shall denote by P∗ the watermarked program produced by our model WaterRPG.
Road Map. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we establish the notation and related terminology,
and present background results. In Section 3 we present our dynamic watermarking model WaterRPG; we first
describe its structural and operational components and then the embedding algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE and
the extracting algorithm Decode CODE.to.RPG. In Section 4 we implement our watermarking model in real Java
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application programs and show two main watermarking approaches supported by the WaterRpg model, namely
naive and stealthy. In Section 5 we evaluate our model under several software watermarking assessment criteria,
while in Section 6 we summarize our work and propose possible future extensions.
2 Background Results
In this section, we present background results and key objects that are used in the design of our watermarking
model WaterRPG. In particular, we briefly present the main results of our previous work concerning the process of
encoding numbers as graph structures namely reducible permutation graphs (or, for short, RPG); we denote such
a graph as F[pi∗]. We also briefly discuss properties of dynamic call-graphs which are used as key-objects in our
watermarking model for embedding the graph F [pi∗] into an application program.
2.1 Encode Numbers as RPGs
We consider finite graphs with no multiple edges. For a graph G, we denote by V (G) and E(G) the vertex set and
edge set of G, respectively. We also consider permutations over the set Nn = {1,2, . . . ,n}.
Let pi be a permutation over the set Nn. We think of permutation pi as a sequence (pi1,pi2, . . . ,pin), so, for
example, the permutation pi = (4,7,6,1,5,3,2) has pi1 = 4, pi2 = 7, etc. Notice that pi−1i is the position in the
sequence of the number i; in our example, pi−14 = 1, pi
−1
1 = 4, pi
−1
3 = 6, etc. The inverse of a permutation pi is the
permutation τ = (τ1,τ2, . . . ,τn) with τpii = piτi = i. A self-inverting permutation (or, involution) is a permutation
that is its own inverse, i.e., pipii = i. Throughout the paper we denote a self-inverting permutation pi (or, for short,
SiP) over the set Nn as pi∗.
A flow-graph is a directed graph F with an initial node s from which all other nodes are reachable. A directed
graph G is strongly connected when there is a path x → y for all nodes x, y in V (G). A node x is an entry for
a subgraph H of the graph G when there is a path p = (y1,y2, . . . ,yk,x) such that p∩H = {x}. A flow-graph is
reducible when it does not have a strongly connected subgraph with two (or more) entries. There are at least three
other equivalent definitions; see, [19].
(I) Encode Numbers as SiPs
In [4], we introduced the notion of bitonic permutations and we presented two algorithms, namely Encode W.to.SiP
and Decode SiP.to.W, for encoding an integer w into a self-inverting permutation pi∗ and extracting it from pi∗.
We have actually proved the following results.
Theorem 2.2. Let w be an integer and let b1b2 · · ·bn be the binary representation of w. The algorithm En-
code W.to.SiP encodes the number w in a self-inverting permutation pi∗ of length 2n+ 1 in O(n) time and space.
Theorem 2.3. Let pi∗ be a self-inverting permutation of length n which encodes an integer w using the algorithm
Encode W.to.SiP. The algorithm Decode SiP.to.W correctly decodes the permutation pi∗ in O(n) time and space.
(II) Encode SiPs as RPGs
Recently, we have presented an efficient and easily implemented algorithm for encoding numbers as reducible
permutation flow-graphs through the use of self-inverting permutations [5]. In particular, we have proposed the
algorithm Encode SiP.to.RPG, which encodes a SiP pi∗ as a reducible permutation flow-graph F[pi∗] by exploiting
domination relations on the elements of pi∗ and using an efficient DAG representation of pi∗.
The whole encoding process takes O(n) time and requires O(n) space, where n is the length of the self-inverting
permutation pi∗. The decoding process takes time and space linear in the size of the flow-graph F[pi∗], that is, the
algorithm Decode RPG.to.SiP takes O(n) time and space. Our results presented in [5] are summarized in the
following theorems.
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pi∗ = (4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 3, 2)
67 5 4 3 2 1 t
F [pi∗]
s
SiP.to.RPG RPG.to.SiP
The watermark number w = 4
W.to.SiP SiP.to.W
Figure 1: The main data components used by our codec algorithms (i.e., the watermark w, the SiP pi∗, and the RPG F [pi∗]) and
a flow of the process of encoding a watermark number w into the graph F [pi∗] and extracting it from F [pi∗].
Theorem 2.4. Let pi∗ be a self-inverting permutation over the set Nn. The algorithm Encode SiP.to.RPG encodes
the permutation pi∗ into a reducible permutation graph F[pi∗] in O(n) time and space.
Theorem 2.5. Let F[pi∗] be a reducible permutation graph of order O(n) produced by the encoding algorithm
Encode SiP.to.RPG. The algorithm Encode RPG.to.SiP correctly extracts the permutation pi∗ from F [pi∗] in O(n)
time and space.
The reducible permutation graph F[pi∗] of the self-inverting permutation pi∗ is directed with a descending ordering
on its nodes s = un+1, un, . . . , u1,u0 = t. Hereafter, we shall call the edge (ui,u j) of graph F [pi∗] forward if i > j
and backward otherwise.
Figure 1 depicts the main data components used by our codec algorithms, i.e., the watermark number w, the
self-inverting permutation pi∗, and the reducible permutation flow-graph F [pi∗]. The same figure shows a flow of
the process of encoding a watermark number w into the graph F[pi∗] and extracting it from F[pi∗].
2.2 Call-graphs
A call-graph is a directed graph that represents calling relationships between program units in a computer program.
Specifically, the nodes f1, f2, . . . , fn of a call-graph represent functions, procedures, classes, or similar program
units and each edge ( fi, f j) indicates that fi calls f j; function fi is called caller while f j is called callee.
Call-graphs can be divided in two main classes of graphs, namely static and dynamic. A static call-graph is
the structure describing those invocations that could be made from one program unit to another in any possible
execution of the program [30]. The static call-graph can be determined from the program source code; we mention
that, its construction is a time consuming process specifically in the case of large scale software [18].
A dynamic call-graph G is a directed graph that includes invocations of caller–callee pairs over an execution
of the program P. Such a graph can be considered as an instance of the corresponding static call-graph for a
specific input sequence I. The call-graph G is a data structure that is used by dynamic optimizers for analyzing and
optimizing the whole-program’s behavior; such a graph can be extracted by a profiler. It is fair to mention that the
construction of a dynamic call-graph G of a program P is not a time consuming process even if P is a large scale
software.
Throughout the paper we denote a dynamic call-graph G of the program P over the input I as G(P, I). Fig-
ure 2(a) depicts the structure of the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of an application program P with input Ikey.
5
F [pi∗]fmain
s
7
6
5
4
3
fs
f7
f6
f5
f4
f3
f2
f1
ft
2
1
t
(a) (b) (c)
fmain
fs
f7
f6
f5
f4
f3
f2
f1
ft
Figure 2: (a) The dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of an application program P. (b) The reducible permutation graph F [pi∗]. (c)
The dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) of the watermarked program P∗.
3 The Dynamic Watermarking Model
Having encoded a watermark number w as reducible permutation graph F [pi∗], let us now present our dynamic
watermarking model WaterRPG; we first demonstrate its structural and operational components and, then, we
describe the embedding and extracting watermarking algorithms.
3.1 Operational Framework
The main idea behind the proposed watermarking model is a systematic modification of appropriate function calls
of the program P so that the execution of the resulting watermarked program P∗ with a specific input Ikey gives a
dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) from which the watermark graph F [pi∗] can be easily constructed.
More precisely, the main operations performed by the WaterRPG model can be outlined as follows: for a
specific input Ikey of the original program P, it takes the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) and the graph F [pi∗], and
produces the watermarked program P∗ so that its dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) with input Ikey is isomorphic to
the watermark graph F[pi∗]. The call-graphs G(P, Ikey) and G(P∗, Ikey) dictate the execution flow of the original
program P and the watermarked program P∗, respectively. Thus, since the call-graph G(P, Ikey) is not isomorphic
to G(P∗, Ikey) in general, the model controls the flow of selected function calls of P∗ so that O(P, I) = O(P∗, I)
for every input I, where O(P, I) (resp. O(P∗, I)) is the output of the program P (resp. P∗) with input I. In
this framework, the program P∗ is produced by only altering appropriate calls of specific functions of the input
program P.
Figure 2 shows the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of an application program P, the reducible permutation graph
F[pi∗] which encodes the number w = 4 and the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) of the watermarked program P∗.
3.2 Model Components
Our watermarking model uses two main categories of components namely structural components and operational
components. The first category includes the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey) of the input program P, the watermark
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graph F [pi∗], and the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) of the watermarked program P∗, while the second category
includes call patterns, control statements and execution rules which are components related to the process of
embedding the graph F [pi∗] into application program P.
We next describe the construction and main properties of the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey), two call patterns
based on which we correspond edges of the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) to function calls, and specific variables and
statements which control the execution of real and water functions.
(I) The Dynamic Call-graph G(P∗, Ikey)
Let F [pi∗] be a watermark graph (or, equivalently, water-graph) on n+ 2 nodes and G(P, Ikey) be the dynamic call-
graph of a program P on n+3 nodes fmain, fs, f1, . . . , fn, ft taken after running the program P with the input Ikey. In
general, the selection of the input Ikey is such that it produces the call-graph G(P, Ikey) having structure as “close”
as possible to the structure of F[pi∗]. We assign the n+ 2 nodes fs = fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft of the call-graph
G(P, Ikey) to n+ 2 nodes s = un+1,un, . . . ,u1,u0 = t of F [pi∗] into 1-1 correspondence; the main function fmain do
not correspond to any node of F [pi∗].
Let (ui,u j) be an edge in graph F[pi∗] and let ( fi, f j) be an edge in call-graph G(P, Ikey). We say that the
edge ( fi, f j) corresponds to edge (ui,u j) iff the node fi corresponds to ui and the node f j corresponds to u j,
0 ≤ i, j ≤ n+ 1. Moreover, if (ui,u j) is a forward (resp. backward) edge in the graph F [pi∗] we say that the
corresponding edge ( fi, f j) in graph G(P, Ikey) is a forward (resp. backward) edge.
The dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) is constructed as follows:
• V (G(P∗, Ikey)) =V (G(P, Ikey)), i.e., it has the same nodes as the call-graph G(P, Ikey);
• E(G(P∗, Ikey)) = E(F [pi∗]), i.e., ( fi, f j) is an edge in E(G(P∗, Ikey)) iff the corresponding (ui,u j) is an edge
in F [pi∗].
The edges of the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) are divided into two categories namely real and water edges; note that, the
real (resp. water) edges correspond to real (resp. water) function calls. An edge ( fi, f j) of the call-graph G(P, Ikey)
is characterized as either
• real edge if ( fi, f j) is an edge in G(P, Ikey), or
• water edge if ( fi, f j) is not an edge in G(P, Ikey).
Figure 2(c) shows the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) along with its real edges (solid arrows) and water edges
(dashed arrows).
(II) Call Patterns
In the implementation phase, we modify the source code of program P using specific function call patterns which
we describe below.
Let P be an application program, G(P, Ikey) be the dynamic call-graph of the program P with input Ikey, and
F[pi∗] be a watermark-graph which we have to embed into P. According to our watermarking model, the embedding
process relies mainly on altering the execution-flow of appropriate function calls of P such that the execution of
the resulting program P∗ with the input Ikey produces a call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) which, after removing the node fmain,
is isomorphic to watermark-graph F [pi∗].
Let ( fi, f j) be an edge of call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) or, equivalently, an edge which we want to appear in G(P∗, Ikey).
Since G(P∗, Ikey) has two types of edges it follows that ( fi, f j) is either real or water edge. Based on the type of
( fi, f j), we do the following:
• if ( fi, f j) is a water edge we add the statement call( f j) in the function fi, while
• if ( fi, f j) is a real edge we add no call statement since the statement call( f j) exists in fi.
Based on whether ( fi, f j) is either a forward or a backward edge we add specific statements in functions fi and f j
according to the following two call patterns namely forward and backward call patterns:
7
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Figure 3: (a) The real-call ( f4, f6) in the call-graph G(P, Ikey) of a program P; bold arrow. (b) The corresponding path-call
( f4, f3, f5, f6) in the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) of the watermarked program P∗; bold arrows.
(a) if ( fi, f j) is a forward edge we add the statement x= x+h() in function fi before the call-site or, equivalently,
call-point of the function f j, and the statement x = x+ c() in the function f j, while
(b) if ( fi, f j) is a backward edge we add the statement x = x+ g() in function fi before the call-site of the
function f j, and the statement x = x+ c() in the function f j,
where x is a variable and h(), g() and c() are functions. Figure 4(a) depicts the forward call pattern or, for short,
f-call, while Figure 4(b) depicts the backward call pattern or, for short, b-call.
Recall that the direct edge ( fi, f j) of a call-graph represents a function call operation where fi is the caller
function and f j the callee function; in other words, it means that in function fi there exists the statement call( f j).
Hereafter, in this case we shall say that ( fi, f j) is a direct call.
In a call-graph of an application program we usually meet sequences of calls of the form ( fi, fk1 , fk2 , . . . , fkm , f j).
For simplicity we set fi = fk0 and f j = fkm+1 and suppose that each of these calls ( fk0 , fk1 ), ( fk1 , fk2), . . ., ( fkm , fm+1)
is either forward or backward. We extend the notion of the direct call ( fi, f j) to indirect call ( fi → f j); an indirect
call consists of a path of functions ( fi, fk1 , . . . , f j) of length ℓ ≥ 2. Using the f-call and b-call patterns, we next
define the path call pattern or, for short, p-call as follows:
(c) if ( fki , fki+1) and ( fki+1 , fki+2) are two consecutive calls of a call sequence, we apply an f-call or a b-call in
( fki+1 , fki+2) by first adding either the statement x = x+h() or x = x+g() in function fki+1 after the call-point
of statement x = x+ c(), and then adding the statement x = x+ c() in fki+2 , 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
Figure 4 shows the structures of the patterns f-call and b-call of the direct call ( fi, f j), and the structure of the
pattern p-call of an indirect call ( fi → f j).
(III) Control Statements and Variables
In any watermarking model both the original program P and the watermarked program P∗ have to operate iden-
tically. Thus, since the call-graphs G(P, Ikey) and G(P∗, Ikey) dictate the execution flow of programs P and P∗,
respectively, and the call-graph G(P, Ikey) is not isomorphic to G(P∗, Ikey), we have to control the flow of selected
function calls of program P∗ so that O(P, I) = O(P∗, I) for every input I.
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Figure 4: (a) The forward call pattern f-call; (b) The backward call pattern b-call; (c) The path call pattern p-call. The boxes
with marked corners are the f|b-blocks.
To do this, we exploit the values of specific variables in a function fi by using them in some selected or
added control statements as part of opaque predicates. More precisely, we use the variable x of the f-call and
b-call patterns and include it in a specific control statement s causing thus an “appropriate execution flow” of the
functions of the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey); with the term “appropriate execution flow” we mean that the execution flow
of the functions of the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) is such that O(P, I) = O(P∗, I) for every input I. Hereafter, we call
cf-statement the control statement s and cf-variable the variable x. In this point, we also define the f-block and
b-block to be specific parts of the code which contain (i) cf-statements, (ii) cf-variables, and (iii) water-foreword or
water-backward function calls. We denote by f|b-block either an f-block or a b-block; in Figure 4, the f|b-blocks
are shown by boxes with marked corners.
We next describe the mechanism which ensures an appropriate execution flow of the functions of G(P∗, Ikey)
through the altering of the execution flow of the functions of the program P by modifying or adding some specific
control statements. In fact, what the mechanism actually does is to modify the conditions or expressions of these
control statements by adding opaque predicates.
Definition 3.1. A predicate Q is opaque at a program point p, if at point p the outcome of Q is known at embedding
time. If Q always evaluates to true we write QTp , for false we write QFp , and if Q sometimes evaluates to true and
sometimes to false we write Q?p.
Let ( fi, f j) be a direct call in our program P∗ or, equivalently, an edge in the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey); it is either
real-forward, real-backward, water-forward, or water-backward edge. In any case, the proposed mechanism uses
the value of the cf-variable x and makes the following operations:
• in function fi: create a control statement (if, switch, for, while, etc), add an opaque predicate Q?p containing
the cf-variable x, and insert it at a point p before the statement x = x+h() or x = x+g(); we could also select
a control statement at a point p, if there exists, consider it as cf-statement and include the opaque predicate
Q?p in its condition part.
• in function f j: create a control statement as in function fi, if such a statement does not exist, and insert it at a
point p before the statement x = x+ c(); if such a statement exists, we only add a new opaque predicate Q?p
in the condition of that statement. The main body of f j is included in a block of a cf-statement the execution
of which is depending upon the behavior (i.e., true or false) of the opaque predicate Q?p.
Note that, the above operations form specific parts of code of functions fi and f j , namely f|b-blocks, i.e., either
f-blocks or b-blocks; see, Figure 4.
Figure 5 shows an example of the modification of the condition part of an if cf-statement via an opaque
predicate; since ( fi, f j) is a water-forward function call, the statement call( f j) does not exist in function fi, and
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Program P Program P∗
function fi() function fi()
. . . . . .
if (condition & Q?p)
if (condition) . . .
. . . x = x+h();
statements; . . .
. . . call f j();
. . .
statements;
. . .
Figure 5: An example of cf-statement modification via opaque predicates in the case where ( fi, f j) is a water-forward function
call.
Program P Program P∗
function fi() function fi()
. . . . . .
if (condition & Q?p)
if (condition) . . .
. . . x = x+g();
call f j(); . . .
. . . call f j();
statements; . . .
. . . statements;
. . .
Figure 6: An example of cf-statement modification via opaque predicates in the case where ( fi, f j) is a real-backward function
call.
Call ( fi, f j) of Program P∗
function fi() function f j()
. . . . . .
if (condition & Q?p) if (condition & Q?p)
. . . . . .
x= x+h(); x = x+c();
. . . . . .
call f j(); if (condition & Q?p)
. . . . . .
statements; statements;
. . . . . .
Figure 7: An example of cf-statement modification via opaque predicates of the function f j in the case where ( fi, f j) is a
water-forward function call.
thus we add it in fi, while the cf-statement is the x = x+ h(). On the other hand, Figure 6 shows an example in
case where ( fi, f j) is a real-backward function call. In this case, the statement call( f j) does exist in fi while the
cf-statement is the x = x+g(). Figure 7 shows an example of the modification of the function f j in the case where
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( fi, f j) is a water-forward function call.
Remark 3.1. Based on the structural properties of the watermark graph F [pi∗] and call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) we can
easily prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let G(P, Ikey) and G(P∗, Ikey) be the call-graphs of programs P and P∗, respectively, on input
Ikey, and let ( fi, f j) be an edge in call-graph G(P, Ikey). Then, there always exists an edge ( fi, f j) or a path
( fi, fk1 , fk2 , . . . , fkm , f j) in call-graph G(P∗, Ikey).
Remark 3.2. In our implementation, in the case where ( fi, f j) is an edge in G(P, Ikey) and ( fi, f j) is not an edge in
G(P∗, Ikey) we have to compute a path ( fi, fk1 , . . . , f j) of function calls in G(P∗, Ikey). Such a path is a shortest path
from f4 to f6 in the graph G(P∗, Ikey); it may consist of all types of edges, that is, real-forward or real-backward
and water-forward or water-backward edges. Figure 3(a) shows the edge ( f4, f6) in G(P, Ikey) which is not an edge
in G(P∗, Ikey), while Figure 3(b) shows its corresponding shortest path from fi to f j, that is, the path ( f4, f3, f5, f6);
note that, ( f4, f3) is a real-forward edge, ( f3, f5) is a real-backward edge, and ( f5, f6) is a water-backward edge.
(VI) Execution Rules
We present the rules based on which we control the execution flow of the functions of P∗ such that O(P, I) =
O(P∗, I) for every input I. In fact, we show in all the cases how the value of Q?p dictates the execution flow of
functions of G(P∗, Ikey).
Let ( fi, f j) be a direct call in program P∗ or, equivalently, an edge in the call-graph G(P∗, Ikey). We distinguish
the following cases:
• ( fi, f j) is real-forward or real-backward: in this case we modify the functions fi and f j as follows:
◦ Function fi: the opaque predicate Q?p in the cf-statement before the cf-value x = x+ h() or x = x+ g()
and the call( f j) is evaluated to true, that is, QTp .
◦ Function f j: the opaque predicate Q?p in the cf-statement before the cf-value x = x+ c() is evaluated to
true, that is, QTp , while the Q?p for the cf-statement which controls the statements of the main body of
the function f j is also evaluated to true, that is, QTp .
• ( fi, f j) is water-forward or water-backward: in this case we modify the functions fi and f j as follows:
◦ Function fi: the opaque predicate Q?p in the cf-statement before the cf-value x = x+ h() or x = x+ g()
and the call( f j) is evaluated to true, that is, QTp .
◦ Function f j: the opaque predicate Q?p in the cf-statement before the cf-value x = x+ c() is evaluated to
true, that is, QTp , while the Q?p for the cf-statement which controls the statements of the main body of
the function f j is evaluated to false, that is, QFp .
Recall that a predicate Q is opaque at a program point p, if at point p the outcome of Q is known at the embedding
time.
Remark 3.3. During the execution of the function fi of the program P∗ only one opaque predicate Q?p of the
cf-statements is evaluated to true with respect to the current value of the cf-variable x.
3.3 Embedding an RPG into a Code
Let us now present our model’s algorithm which efficiently watermarks an application program P by embedding the
reducible permutation graph F [pi∗] into P. The proposed embedding algorithm, which we call Encode RPG.to.CODE,
is described below.
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P F [pi∗] P ∗+ →
T G(P, Ikey)
G(P ∗, Ikey)
T ∗, C∗
Steps 1 and 2
Step 3
Step 5
Steps 6, 7 and 8
Step 4
Figure 8: A block diagram of the main operations of the embedding algorithm.
Embedding Algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE
1. Take as input the source code of the program P, select an input Ikey, and construct the call-graph G(P, Ikey); let
S = ( fmain, fs = fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft) be the execution sequence of the functions of call-graph G(P, Ikey),
that is, fi appears before f j in S if fi is executed before f j with input Ikey, and let s = un+1,un, . . . ,u1,u0 = t
be the n+ 2 nodes of the watermark graph F [pi∗];
2. Remove the node fmain from G(P, Ikey) and assign an exact pairing (i.e., 1-1 correspondence) of the n+ 2
nodes of G(P, Ikey) or, equivalently, the n+ 2 functions fs = fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft to the nodes of F [pi∗];
3. Construct the graph G(P∗, Ikey) as follows:
3.1. V (G(P∗, Ikey)) =V (G(P, Ikey)), i.e., G(P∗, Ikey) has the same nodes as the call-graph G(P, Ikey);
3.2. E(G(P∗, Ikey)) = E(F [pi∗]), i.e., ( fi, f j) is an edge in E(G(P∗, Ikey)) iff the corresponding (ui,u j) is an
edge in graph F [pi∗];
4. Create a call-table T of size m which contains all the m function calls ( fi, f j) as they appear in the execution
trace of program P with input Ikey;
5. Create the tables T ∗ and C ∗, both of size m∗, as follows:
5.1. For each function call ( fi, f j) of table T do the following:
• if ( fi, f j) is a function call of G(P∗, Ikey) then insert ( fi, f j) in table T ∗ and its characterization in
table C ∗; in this step, ( fi, f j) is characterized as either real-forward or real-backward;
• if ( fi, f j) is not a function call in graph G(P∗, Ikey) then:
◦ compute the shortest path ( fi, fk1 , fk2 , . . . , fkℓ , f j) from node fi to node f j in G(P∗, Ikey),
◦ insert the calls ( fi, fk1), ( fk1 , fk2), . . ., ( fkℓ , f j) in table T ∗, in that order, and their characteri-
zations in table C ∗; in this step, a call is characterized as either real-forward, real-backward,
water-forward, or water-backward (see, Subsection 3.2), and
◦ mark the first and last function calls of the shortest path, i.e., ( fi, fk1) and ( fkℓ , f j), as first and
last, respectively;
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5.2. For each function call ( fi, f j) of graph G(P∗, Ikey) check whether it appears in table T ∗; if not, do the
following:
• find the first appearance of a function call of type ( fo, fi) in table T ∗, where fo is any function;
• insert the function call ( fi, f j) in table T ∗ after the call ( fo, fi) and its characterization in the
corresponding row in table C ∗;
6. Take each function call ( fi, f j) of the table T ∗ and modify the functions fi and f j of program P as follows:
6.1. Add/replace call statements and locate appropriate call points in function fi as follows:
• if ( fi, f j) is a real function call then find the statement call( f j) in function fi and locate its call-
point;
• if ( fi, f j) is a water function call then:
◦ if it is the first function call of a short path, then find the last function call of that path in
table T ∗, say, ( fkℓ , flast), replace the statement call( flast ) in function fi with the statement
call( f j), and locate its call-point;
◦ otherwise, if call( f j) does not exist in f-block of function fi, add the statement call( f j) in
f|b-block and locate its call-point;
6.2. Insert either statement x = x+ h() or x = x+ g() before the statement call( f j), if ( fi, f j) is character-
ized either as forward or backward, respectively;
6.3. Include both statements x = x+ h() or x = x+ g() and call( f j) in a control statement and evaluate it
as true or false using the cf-variable x;
6.4. Include all the statements of the b-block of function fi in a control statement and evaluate it using the
cf-variable x;
6.5. Add the statement x = x+ c() before the f|b-block of function f j;
7. For each function call ( fout , f j) of program P s.t. fout /∈ G(P∗, Ikey) and f j ∈ G(P∗, Ikey) do the following:
7.1. Find the first appearance of a function call of type ( fo, f j) in table T ∗, such that fo is any function
and f j is either a real function call or the last function of a shortest path ( fi, fk1 , fk2 , . . . , fkℓ , f j), i.e.,
( fo, f j) = ( fkℓ , f j);
7.2. Take the value of the cf-variable x of function fkℓ , say, “value”, and insert the statement x = “value” in
function fout before the call-point of the statement call( f j);
8. Return the source code of the modified program P which is the watermarked program P∗;
Remark 3.4. In Step 5 of the embedding algorithm, the edges ( fi, f j) are included into the table T in a specific
order. This order is determined by the order they appeared in the execution trace of program P with input Ikey, i.e.,
if the function call ( fi, f j) appears before ( fk, fℓ) in the execution trace of P, then the edge ( fi, f j) appears before
the edge ( fk, fℓ) in table T .
Remark 3.5. Let ( fi, f j) be an edge which is handled in Step 6 of the embedding algorithm and let the statement
call( f j) appear more that once in function fi. We point out that in this case we insert both the cf-variable and
cf-statement before the call-site of each statement call( f j) in function fi.
The Algorithm by an Example. In order to illustrate the working of the embedding algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE,
we present a simple example and show the main operations (i.e., function calls) and the values of the main variables
during the algorithm’s execution.
In our example, we chose the original program P to be one that computes the shortest paths in a weighted
graph G with non-negative edge-values; it takes as input a graph G and a node s and computes the shortest paths
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s
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InputGs
Split
Adjacent
Dikjstra
FindMin
Relax
PrintPath
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InputGs
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Figure 9: (a) The dynamic call-graph G(Shortest Path, Ikey). (b) The reducible permutation graph F [pi∗] which encodes the
watermark w = 2, where pi∗ = (3,5,1,4,2). (c) The dynamic call-graph G(Shortest Path∗, Ikey).
from s to every other node v ∈ V (G)−{s}. The program P, which we call Shortest Path, consists of 8 func-
tions (i.e., 7 functions plus the main) and have the property that its dynamic call-graph G(Shortest Path, Ikey)
is the same for every input Ikey; see, its dynamic call-graph in Figure 9(a). Moreover, we chose to embed the
watermark number w = 2 into the source code of program Shortest Path. The reducible permutation graph
F[pi∗] which encodes the watermark w = 2 consists of 7 nodes and is depicted in Figure 9(b). We point out that,
according to our model’s rules, the number w = 2 is encoded by the SiP pi∗ = (3,5,1,4,2) and it can be success-
fully embedded into Shortest Path since our program consists of 8 functions and the graph F[pi∗] contains 7
nodes; note that, the number w = 3 is the max number which can be embedded into our program since the graph
F[pi∗] for encoding the watermark w = 4 has to contain 9 nodes (see, Section 2.1 and also Figure 1). The dy-
namic call-graph G(Shortest Path∗, Ikey) of our watermarked program is presented in Figure 9(c). Observe that,
G(Shortest Path∗, Ikey) is isomorphic to the watermark graph F[(3,5,1,4,2)].
In Figure 10 we show the call-tables T and T ∗ of the programs Shortest Path and Shortest Path∗, re-
spectively, the edge characterization of each function call ( fi, f j) of the call-table T ∗ (see, Table C ∗), and the
increment of the value of the c f -variable x in each case. More precisely, in Table C ∗ each ( fi, f j) is characterized
as either r f (real-forward), rb (real-backward), w f (water-forward), or wb (water-backward), while in the case
where a function call ( fi, f j) is replaced by a path of calls (shortest path) we characterize as first (resp. last) the
first (resp. last) function call of that path. The fourth table of Figure 10 shows the values (in parentheses) of the
c f -variable x in both functions fi and f j of the program Shortest Path∗. Recall that according to the f-call and
b-call patterns (see, Section 3.2), if ( fi, f j) is a forward edge we add the statement x = x+h() in function fi, while
if ( fi, f j) is a backward edge we add the statement x = x+g() in function fi; in both cases we unconditionally add
the statement x = x+ c() in function f j.
In our example, we initialize the c f -variable x = 0 and consider for simplicity reasons constant values for the
functions h(), g(), and c(), that is, h() = 3, g() = 2, and c() = 1. Based on the above, we take the first function call
(main,InputGs) of Table T ∗ and, since it is characterized as r f in Table C ∗, we increase by h() the value of the
c f -variable x in function main before the call site of InputGs, i.e., we set x = x+h() and thus x = 3. In the callee
function InputGs we always increase by c() the value of the variable x, i.e., we set x = x+ c() and thus x = 4. We
observe that, the function call (Split,InputGs) of Table T ∗ is characterized as wb (water-backward) and, thus,
we increase by g() = 2 the value of the variable x in function Split, again before the call site of InputGs, i.e., x
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Call-table T
main→ InputGs
InputGs→ Split
InputGs→ Split
InputGs→ Adjacent
main→ Dikjstra
Dikjstra→ FindMin
Relax→ Dikjstra
Relax→ PrintPath
Call-table T ∗
main→ InputGs
InputGs→ Split
Split→ InputGs
InputGs→ Split
InputGs→ Split
Split→ Adjacent
Adjacent→ Split
main→ InputGs
InputGs→ Split
Split→ Adjacent
Adjacent→ Dikjstra
Dikjstra→ InputG
Dikjstra→ FindMin
FindMin→ Adjacent
Dikjstra→ FindMin
FindMin→ Relax
Relax→ Split
Relax→ PrintPath
Table C ∗
rf
rf
wb
rf
wf – first
wf – last
wb
wf – first
wf
wf
wf – last
wb
rf
wb
wf – first
wf – last
wb
rf
Values of the cf-variable
x+=3 (3) → x+=1 (4)
x+=3 (7) → x+=1 (8)
x+=2 (10) → ... (11)
x+=3 (14) → ... (15)
x+=3 (18) → ... (19)
x+=3 (22) → ... (23)
x+=2 (25) → ... (26)
x+=3 (29) → ... (30)
x+=3 (33) → ... (34)
x+=3 (37) → ... (38)
x+=3 (41) → ... (42)
x+=2 (44) → ... (45)
x+=3 (48) → ... (49)
x+=2 (51) → ... (52)
x+=3 (55) → ... (56)
x+=3 (59) → ... (60)
x+=2 (62) → ... (63)
x+=3 (66) → x+=1 (67)
Figure 10: The call-tables T and T ∗ of the programs Shortest Path and Shortest Path∗, respectively, the edge characterization
table C ∗, and the values of the c f -variable.
becomes equal to 10 because in the previous function call x’s value was 8 (see, last table of Figure 10). Note that,
by construction the shortest paths of function calls do not intersect.
3.4 Extracting the RPG from the Code
We next present our WaterRPG model’s algorithm for extracting the graph F[pi∗] from the program P∗ watermarked
by the embedding algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE. The proposed extracting algorithm works as follows:
Extracting Algorithm Decode CODE.to.RPG
1. Take as input the program P∗ watermarked by the embedding algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE and run it
with input Ikey;
2. Construct the call-table T using the execution trace of the program P∗ with input Ikey;
3. Construct the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) using the call-table T as follows:
3.1. take all the function calls ( fi, f j) of table T and add both functions fi and f j in the set V ; note that, V
has n+ 2 elements since T contains n+ 2 different functions;
3.2. take all the function calls ( fi, f j) of table T and add the selected pairs in the set E; note that, E contains
2n+ 1 elements;
3.3. assign the set V to V (G(P∗, Ikey)) and the set E to E(G(P∗, Ikey));
4. Remove the node fmain from the graph G(P∗, Ikey); the resulting graph is a reducible permutation graph
isomorphic to F [pi∗] (see, the embedding algorithm Encode RPG.to.CODE);
15
5. Compute the unique Hamiltonian path HP of the graph G(P∗, Ikey); let HP = ( f0, f1, f2, . . . , fn, fn+1) be the
Hamiltonian path of G(P∗, Ikey);
6. Relabel the nodes of the graph G(P∗, Ikey) according to their order in the HP as follows: f0 = un+1, f1 = un,
f2 = un−1, . . ., fn = u1, fn+1 = u0; the resulting graph G(P∗, Ikey) has a unique Hamiltonian path HP =
(un+1,un,un−1, . . . ,u1,u0) and thus G(P∗, Ikey) = F [pi∗];
7. Return the reducible permutation graph F[pi∗];
Remark 3.6. In Step 5 of the extracting algorithm, we compute the unique Hamiltonian path of the graph F [P∗].
Indeed, it has been shown that the reducible permutation graph F [pi∗] has always a unique Hamiltonian path,
denoted by HP(F [pi∗]), and this Hamiltonian path can be found in O(n) time, where n is the number of nodes of
F[pi∗] (author’s papers). Since F[pi∗] is isomorphic to G′(P∗, Ikey) we can compute the unique Hamiltonian path HP
of the graph F [P∗] within the same time complexity.
4 Implementation
In this section we present in detail the watermarking process performed by our WaterRPG model on a Java applica-
tion program P. We show the implementation of our watermarking process using a real program with market-name
Laser which we have downloaded from the website www.java−gaming.org containing various and different in
characteristics game application programs.
Let fs = fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft be the functions of the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey), where P= Laser. Recall
that the functions fs = fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft are into 1-1 correspondence with the nodes s= un+1,un, . . . ,u1,u0 = t
of the reducible permutation graph F [pi∗] which encodes the watermark number w.
We focus on the function fi = up() of the program Laser; in our implementation, the important part of the
Java code of fi = up() is the following:
public void up{
if (b[cx+1][cy−1−1].bgr() . . .){
hlth−−;
}
b[cx+1][cy].bgr(black);
.
.
.
We first show the straightforward case of the watermarking process on function fi = up() and, then, we proceed
with advanced cases. In all cases our model uses the cf-variable x which increases its value by h() = 3, g() = 2,
and c() = 1; see, Call Patterns in Section 3.2.
Before we proceed to watermark the function fi = up(), we divide the callee functions of fi into the following
three categories:
Acallee : contains the callee functions f 1j and f 2j of fi which correspond to forward node u1j and backward node
u2j of graph F[pi∗], respectively; that is, both f 1j and f 2j are functions of the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey).
Bcallee : contains the callee functions f ∗j of fi which are executed with the input Ikey except of f 1j and f 2j ; that is,
f ∗j is a function of the dynamic call-graph G(P, Ikey).
Ccallee : contains all the callee functions f ∗∗j of fi which are not executed with the input Ikey.
Naive-case Implementation
Let ui be the node of graph F [pi∗] which corresponds to fi = up(), and let u1j and u2j be the two nodes of F [pi∗] such
that (ui,u1j) and (ui,u2j) are the forward and backward outgoing edges of node ui, respectively. Let f 1j and f 2j be the
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two functions of G(P, Ikey) which correspond to nodes u1j and u2j , respectively; in our implementation, f 1j = down()
and f 2j = health().
We next describe in a step-by-step manner the modifications we make in function fi = up() according to the
watermarking rules of our WaterRPG model. The watermarking process of the naive-case implementation consists
of the following phases:
(I) We first include the body of the function fi into a control statement holding opaque predicates of the cf-
variable x. In our naive-case implementation, we use the statement if-then-else and add opaque predicates
of the form x== value; see, statement if (x== 271 && down== false) {...} of Figure 11.
Then, we handle the functions f 1j and f 2j of categories Acallee; in particular, we locate the call-points of all
the statements call( f 1j ) and call( f 2j ) in fi, if any, and we do the following:
◦ We form an f-block, in the case where fi contains f 1j , by adding the statement x = x+ h() in a call-
point before that of call( f 1j ) and including both x = x+ h() and call( f 1j ) into a control statement
with opaque predicates using the cf-variable x; in our implementation, f 1j = down() and h() = 3.
◦ We similarly form a b-block, in the case where fi contains f 2j , by adding the statement x = x+ g()
instead of x = x+ h() as before; in our implementation, f 2j = health() and g() = 2.
In the case where the function fi does not contain call( f 1j ) or call( f 2j ), we locate a call-point before that
of the control statement if-then-else and we do the following:
◦ If fi does not contain call( f 1j ), we add the statements x = x+ h() and call( f 1j ) in this order and,
then, we include both x = x+ h() and call( f 1j ) into a control statement with conditions consisting
of opaque predicates using the cf-variable x; recall that h() = 3; see, statement if (x== 271) &&
down== true) {...} of Figure 11.
◦ If fi does not contain call( f 2j ), we add the statements x = x+ g() and call( f 2j ) in this order; we
also include both statements into a control statement as before; see, statement if (x== 268) {...} of
Figure 11.
(II) In this phase, we locate a point in the beginning of the callee function f 1j (resp. f 2j ) of function fi, add the
statement x = x+c() in this point and include x = x+c() into a control statement with conditions consisting
of opaque predicates using the cf-variable x; in our implementation c() = 1; see, statement if (x == 267)
{...} of Figure 11.
(III) We next handle all the functions f ∗j of category Bcallee, that is, the callee functions of fi that are functions
of the call-graph G(P, Ikey) except of f 1j and f 2j . For every direct call ( fi, f ∗j ) we compute the sequence
( fi, fk1 , . . . , f ∗j ) which corresponds to the shortest path (ui,uk1 , . . . ,u∗j) from ui to u∗j in graph F [pi∗]; then, we
remove the statement call( f ∗j ) from fi and add either the statements x = x+ h() and call( f 1j ) if (ui,uk1)
is a forward edge or the statements x = x+ g() and call( f 1j ) if (ui,uk1) is a backward edge in F [pi∗]; in
any case, we include the added statements into a control statement with conditions consisting of opaque
predicates using the cf-variable x.
(IV) In the last phase we handle all the functions fout of program P which call functions that correspond to
nodes of graph F[pi∗], i.e., fout is not a function of the call-graph G(P, Ikey) and calls a function f j of fs =
fn+1, fn, . . . , f1, f0 = ft . We find the first appearance of a function call of type ( fout , f j) in table T ∗ such
that f j is either a real function call or the last function of a shortest path ( fi, fk1 , fk2 , . . . , fkℓ , f j) (see, Step 7
of embedding algorithm), take the value of the cf-variable x of function fkℓ , say, “value”, and insert the
statement x = “value” in function fout before the call-point of the statement call( f j).
All the functions f ∗∗j of category Ccallee are ignored during the process of watermarking the function fi = up()
since they are not executed with the input Ikey.
Remark 4.1. In order to avoid a large increment of the value of cf-variable x, in the implementation Phase (I), if a
call function is included into a loop structure we could apply the call patterns as follows: (i) we add the assignment
of the cf-variable (i.e., x = x+ h() or x = x+ g() assignments) outside this loop, and (ii) we add the statement
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The Naive-case Implementation Two Stealthy-case Implementations
public void up{ public void up{ public void up{
if(x == 267){ x= x+1; x= x+1;
x= x+1; if(x == 268&&down == true){ if(x== 268&&down == true){
} x= x+3; x= x+3;
if(x == 268){ down(); down();
x= x+2; if(x == 272){ }
health(); x= x+2; else{
} health(); if(b[cx+1][cy−1−1] . . .
if(x == 271&&down == true){ } &&x== 268){
x= x+3; } hlth−−;
down(); else{ x= x+2;
} if(b[cx+1][cy−1−1] . . . health();
if(x == 271&&down == false){ &&x == 268){ }
if(b[cx+1][cy−1−1] . . .){ hlth−−; b[cx+1][cy].bgr(black);
hlth−−; }
.
.
.
} b[cx+1][cy].bgr(black);
b[cx+1][cy].bgr(black);
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure 11: The function up() of the original program Laser watermarked with the naive approach and a stealthy approach;
the functions down() and health() are both water functions and belong to category Bcallee, i.e., both are functions of
G(Laser, Ikey).
x = value be f ore loop inside and before the end of the loop, where value be f ore loop is the value of x before the
execution of this loop.
Stealthy-case Implementation
We next show properties and modification rules of the model’s call patterns based on which we can stealthily
watermark a Java application program P. The main modification cases, which we call stealthy cases, supported by
the WaterRPG model are the following:
(S.1) Making nested patterns: We can merge f-statements and b-statements in any way; for example, we can in-
clude the control b-statement if (x== 268) {...} inside the f-statement if (x == 271 && down== true)
{...} after the statement call( f 1j ) = up(); we appropriately change their opaque predicates; see, Figure 11.
(S.2) Adding multiple water-calls: Since water-calls do not affect the functionality of the program, we can add
multiple water-calls in the body of the function fi = up(). Our aim is to increase the complexity of the source
code making thus difficult for an attacker to understand it, the more the complexity the more the extend of
the code.
(S.3) Removing control statements: We can remove the control statement that includes the statement x = x+ c()
of a function fi = up() (Phase III); we can do that in the case where fi is called by a function of category
Ccallee; note that, functions of category Ccallee do not modify the value of the cf-variable x.
(S.4) Constructing complex opaque predicates: We can construct more complex opaque predicates thus making
the control flow of a program more difficult for an attacker to analyze it. In Phase I, we added opaque
predicates of the form (x== value1 || x== value2 || . . . || x== valuem), whereas in the stealthy case
we evaluate the cf-variable in a range of values (x<= valuei && x>= valuej) by adding logical and
relational operators.
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(S.5) Merging control statements: We can merge control statements that we added in program P∗ with program’s
original control statements by appropriately merging their corresponding logical expressions.
(S.6) Assigning complex expressions: In the naive case the incremental functions of statements x = x+ h() and
x = x+ g() have constant values h() = 3 and g() = 2, respectively. We can easily use any complex function
for h() and g() in order to systematically increase the cf-variable x.
(S.7) Using more cf-variables: We can use more that one cf-variable to control the flow of the watermarked
program P∗. We built relationships between the cf-variables in order to be used interchangeably throughout
the execution phase. We establish thresholds that determine the use of different cf-variables.
In Figure 11 we present two stealthy-case implementations of the function up() of the original program Laser
(second and third code). The functions down() and health() are both water functions and belong to category
Bcallee, that is, both are functions of G(Laser, Ikey).
5 Model Evaluation
Having designed a static or dynamic software watermarking model, it is very important to evaluate it under various
criteria in order to gain information about its practical behavior. Several criteria have been appeared in the liter-
ature and used for evaluating the properties of a proposed watermarking model and showing its strong and weak
implementation points [10]. It is a common belief that a good watermarking model must have at least the following
characteristics [9]:
◦ a software watermarking model should not adversely affect the size and execution time of the program P;
◦ the ratio of the number of bits of the whole program P to the number of bits encoded by the watermark w
should be high;
◦ a model must be resilient against a reasonable set of malicious watermarking attacks;
◦ both host program P and watermarked program P∗ should have similar statistical properties.
In our work, we use various criteria which mainly aim to evaluate our WaterRPG model’s performance and its
resiliency. More precisely, we propose a set of evaluation criteria consisting of two main categories:
(I) Performance criteria.
(II) Resilience criteria.
The Performance criteria (or, P-criteria) concern the behavior of the resulting watermarked program P∗ and the
quality and effectiveness of the embedded watermark w, while the Resilience criteria (or, R-criteria) concern the
robustness and resistance of the embedded watermark w against malicious user attacks.
For our evaluation process, we implemented the WaterRPG model on Java application programs and exper-
imentally evaluated it under several P-criteria and R-criteria. More precisely, we selected a number of Java ap-
plication programs downloaded from the free non commercial game database website www.java−gaming.org
and watermarked them using the two watermarking approaches supported by our WaterRPG model, i.e., the Naive
approach, and the Stealthy approach. The selected Java programs are almost of the same size and are watermarked
by embedding watermarks of three different sizes; we use watermarking graphs F [pi∗] having number of nodes
n = 11, n = 13, and n = 15.
All the experiments were performed on a computer with dual-core 2.0 GHZ processors, 3.0 GB of main mem-
ory under Linux operating system using Java version 1.6.0.26 of the SDK (Software Development Kit).
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5.1 Performance
The performance criteria (or, P-criteria) mostly focus only on how much a watermarking model modifies the code
of a program P. As these criteria range in satisfactory levels, both programs P and P∗ have almost identical execu-
tion behavior and similar codes, and thus the code associated with the watermark w is very likely to pass unnoticed
by the attacker’s eyes; in our classification, the P-criteria are divided into the following two main categories:
• Data-rate: The data-rate criterion measures the ratio |w|/|P|, where |w| is the size of the embedded water-
mark w and |P| is the size of the original program P. A model should have a high data-rate so that it can
embed a large message.
• Embedding overhead: The additional execution time and space caused by embedding the watermark w into
program P, that is,
(i) time overhead, and
(ii) space overhead: (ii.a) disk space usage, and (ii.b) heap space usage.
• Part protection: The part protection criterion evaluates how well the watermark is distributed or spread
throughout the entire code of P. This is an important performance property of program P∗ because it de-
creases the probability that the watermark will be altered or destroyed when small changes are made to
program P∗.
• Credibility: The credibility criterion evaluates how much detectable the watermark is. The embedded wa-
termark should be easily extracted from P∗ and the detector (i.e., the extracting algorithm) should minimize
the probability to generate false positives and false negative results.
• Stealth: A watermarked program P∗ has the stealth property if the embedded watermark should exhibit the
same properties as the code of P or data around it and thus it should be difficult to detect. In other words, P∗
should have characteristics that are not different from a typical program so that an attacker can not use these
characteristics to locate and attack the watermark.
Let us now discuss on the performance of the WaterRPG model and let us first focus on the data-rate of our model.
Data-rate. This criterion essentially depends on the size of the watermark w or, in our model, of the size of the
embedding watermark graph F [pi∗]. We consider that the size of the watermark graph is the number of vertices
that it contains. In order to measure the data-rate ratio |w|/|P|, we compute the size of the original program P by
counting the number of functions it has, since in our model we assign an exact pairing of the nodes of F [pi∗] to the
functions of P. We claim that our model has high data rate for large programs since in such programs we are able
to encode a watermark graph less than or equal to programs’ size. According to our model for encoding a number
as reducible permutation graph a relatively large graph encodes a large set of different integer numbers.
Embedding overhead. In order to evaluate the embedding overhead of our WaterRPG model we choose the
parameters (i) execution time, (ii.a) disk usage, and (ii.b) heap space usage. We measure these parameters on the
selected Java application programs P and the corresponding watermarked programs P∗ under both the naive and
stealthy approaches. In the evaluation process, each program is executed “n” times with different inputs. The
run-time of each tested program is computed by taking the difference of the start-value and the end-value of the
Java method System.currentTimeMillis().
The execution time overhead is proportional to the size of the watermarking graph F[pi∗]. The experimental
results in Table 2 indicate that for a graph F [pi∗] on n = 11, n = 13 and n = 15 nodes the execution time of the
naive watermarking causes a slight increase of 5.25%, 7.65% and 11.07%, respectively, while the corresponding
increments for the stealthy case are even smaller.
The disk storage requirements of programs P∗ compared to P increases as the number of nodes of the graph
F[pi∗] increases. Applying the stealthy approach a noteworthy amount of storage memory is saved because many
of the control statements and opaque predicates that were not necessary to maintain proper functionality of the
program P∗ removed safely from the code. Table 3 illustrates the percentage increment of disk demand for P∗N and
P∗S , as well as the improvement caused by the stealth approach in comparison to the naive. The experimental results
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Table 2: Execution Time (msec)
Nodes in F [pi∗] P → P∗N P → P∗S P∗N → P∗S
11 +5.25% +3.82% -1.37%
13 +7.65% +5.99% -1.56%
15 +11.07% +9.19% -1.72%
Table 3: Disk Usage (Kb)
Nodes in F [pi∗] P → P∗N P → P∗S P∗N → P∗S
11 +20.98% +16.71% -3.65%
13 +26.35% +18.81% -6.34%
15 +30.10% +21.76% -6.85%
Table 4: Heap Space Usage (Mb)
Nodes in F [pi∗] P → P∗N P → P∗S P∗N → P∗S
11 +7.69% +4.61% -2.94%
13 +10.76% +6.15% -4.34%
15 +15.38% +9.23% -5.63%
show that our WareRpg watermarking model has a similar performance for the heap space usage; see, Table 4. The
results for all the evaluating parameters are also depicted in a graphical form in Figure 12.
Towards the evaluation of the space overhead of our watermarking method we compute the total amount of the
bytecode instructions added to watermarked program P∗. In particular, we compute the percentage of the increment
resulted by adding control statements, functions calls and variable assignments to the program P. To this end, we
count the bytecode instructions of watermarked programs P∗N and P∗S that belong to four main categories: (i) Control
statements, (ii) Invocations, (iii) Assignments, and (iv) Rest instructions; see, Table 5. Note that the category (iv)
contains all the bytecode instructions that remain unchanged after the watermarking process. Indicatively, in
Table 6 we show the number of some bytecode instructions of the tested Java application programs P.
Part protection. The idea behind the property of part protection is to split the watermark into pieces and then
broadly spread it across the application program P. The splitted watermark w has a better chance to survive if
an attack modification on some w’s parts does not affect the recognition process. The more the part protection is
increased, the more likely a watermark remains unchanged after a possible theft or modification of a portion of the
whole watermarked code.
In our case, we do not split the watermark in order to encoded it into code, and thus our model has a low
part protection. However, an attack modification on a part of our watermark code may cause incorrectness of P∗
unless the attacker goes through all the parts of the watermark code and makes appropriate modifications. On the
other hand, since we can encode the same number w into more than one reducible permutation graphs F[pi∗] (see,
[7]), our model could obtain higher part protection by encoding multiple water-graphs F [pi∗] using different input
sequences which produce different dynamic call graphs protecting thus larger code area.
Credibility. The credibility of a watermarking model is dependent on how detectable the watermark is. Concern-
ing our model, we should point out that the rates of false positive and false negative outcomes are noticeable low in
the case where the program P∗ has not being attacked. In addition, even the watermarked code undergoes attacks,
the execution sequence S of the functions of P∗ is very hardly distorted. Nevertheless, an attacker could make
such a distortion possible but then he has to replace the sequence of function calls S with a sequence S′ in order
to produce exactly the same output keeping the functionality and correctness of the remaining code; it is very time
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Figure 12: Graphical representation of the results for parameters (i) Execution time, (ii.a) Disk usage and (ii.b) Heap space usage
of the Original program P, and the corresponding watermarked program under both the Naive P∗N and Stealthy P∗S approaches.
consuming for an attacker to find an S′ and test it under various inputs.
Stealth. Some common attacks against watermarking systems begin by identifying the code composing the wa-
termark. To resist such attacks, watermarking should be stealthy: the watermark code embedded to a program P
should be locally indistinguishable from the rest code of P so that it is hidden from malicious users.
The code embedded to program P by our watermarking model WaterRPG is not highly unusual since our model
modifies the existing source code of P by only altering its control flow in order to produce, during the execution
of P∗ with the secret input Ikey, a dynamic call graph isomorphic to the watermark graph F [pi∗]. More precisely,
our model does not add any dead or dummy code but only encodes the graph F [pi∗] using three groups of bytecode
instructions: (i) call functions, (ii) control statements, and (iii) variable assignments. Most of these instructions are
already used in the original source code P and thus the embedded watermark code is quite difficult to be located
in the watermarked program P∗. The experimental results indicate that there is an increment from 10.6% to 45.5%
(resp. from 10.6% to 32.4%) of instructions of these three groups in the naive (resp. stealthy) implementation.
22
Table 5 shows the number of bytecode instructions, on average, of each of the three instruction groups of the tested
programs P and the increments of these instructions in both naive P∗N and stealthy P∗S implementation cases, while
Table 6 depicts the number of some indicative bytecode instructions of the three instruction groups.
5.2 Resilience
The resilience criteria (or, R-criteria) mainly focus on how the embedded watermark resists against attacks made by
malicious users. These attacks are either targeted-attacks on the code composing the watermark w or widespread-
attacks on the whole code of program P∗. According to the type of attacks, the R-criteria are divided into the
following two main categories:
• Water-resilience: The water-resilience criteria measure the resistance of the watermark w against attacks
on its own code; we call these attacks targeted-attacks or water-attacks. In this case the attacker first detects
the watermark w, that is, the code of program P∗ associated with the watermark w, and then makes specific
operations on that code in order to
◦ remove (e.g., by subtracting part of the watermark, or even the whole watermark),
◦ destroy (e.g., by applying semantics preserving transformations so that w can be undetectable, i.e., the
detector can not find the watermark), or even
◦ alter the watermark w (e.g., by changing the structure of the embedded watermark w so that it causes
the extracting algorithm to produce a different watermark w′).
The attacker can also add a new watermark w′ into P∗ without modifying the existing w in order to confuse
the detector.
Table 5: Three Group of Bytecode Instructions
Bytecode P P∗N P∗S
Control Statements 519.4 42.0% 25.0%
Invocations 188.3 10.6% 10.6%
Assignments 1346.7 45.5% 32.4%
Rest Instructions 941.6 0% 0%
Table 6: Indicative Bytecode Instructions of each Group
Bytecode P P∗N P∗S
Control Statements
if icmpne 19,2 78,1 57,6
ifne 3,1 4,5 4,5
goto 43,5 45,3 45,3
Invocations
invokevirtual 188,2 208,4 208,4
Assignments
iconst 1 186,2 202,7 202,7
getstatic 368,6 614,4 529,5
iadd 84,9 132,8 132,8
alaod 0 136,7 156,2 156,2
Rest Instructions
dup 33,6 33,6 33,6
ldc 19,7 19,7 19,7
23
• Code-resilience: The code-resilience criteria measure the resistance of the watermark w against attacks
made on the whole code of the watermarked program P∗; we call these attacks widespread-attacks or code-
attacks. In the case the attacker fails to detect the code of program P∗ associated with the watermark w,
and thus he makes attacks in the whole code aiming in this way to maximize the distortion of possible
watermarking protections; in our classification, the code-resilience criteria include:
◦ obfuscation (e.g., by transferring a reducible flow graph to non-reducible),
◦ optimization (e.g., by removing information for debugging with an automated tool, such as ProGuard),
◦ de-compilation (e.g., by using a malicious tool, such as Java-Decompiler), and
◦ language-transformation (e.g., by converting a watermarked program P∗ from C++ to Java).
As in the case performance criteria, we next discuss on the resilience of our WaterRPG model focusing first on the
water-resilience criteria.
Water-resilience. The water-attacks take place when the code of the watermark w, the graph F [pi∗] in our model, is
known to the attacker. In this case, he makes attacks on the structure of watermark graph F [pi∗] in order to destroy
it or even to remove F [pi∗] from program P∗.
Our model embeds the watermark graph F [pi∗] into an application program P by using opaque predicates in
specific control statements in order to manipulate the flow of selected function calls of the watermarked program
P∗ so that it reserves an appropriate execution, that is, O(P, I) = O(P∗, I) for every input I. In general, it is hard for
an attacker to deduce an opaque predicate at run time. Specifically, the usage of opaque predicates in our model
enables us to dictate the execution flow of function calls and also makes the programs’ control flow difficult for an
attacker to analyze it either statically or dynamically. In fact, our model creates dependencies on the data between
the original program P and the watermark F [pi∗] making thus the watermark graph F[pi∗] operational part of the
program P. This causes our model resilient to water-attacks.
Indeed, if the attacker makes a modification in a value of a cf-variable x in a call-site p (e.g., he increases x by
a constant c), then he has to properly modify all the values of all the cf-variables in every call-site of the execution
flow after p (e.g., by adding the same constant c) so that P∗ still remains functional, but then the watermark F [pi∗]
also remains unchained. Moreover, if the attacker tries to remove any of the cf-statements then the program P∗ is
not longer functional since a “gap” is occurred on the execution flow of P∗ (e.g., the program executes a part of a
code which in same cases produces incorrect results). What is more, every cf-statement produces different results,
so our model withstands common subexpression elimination.
Additionally, if the attacker modifies either a real-call or a water-call then the program P∗ is no longer opera-
tional. Indeed, let the attacker modifies a water-call call( f j) in function fi which appears in a path ( fa, . . ., fk, fi,
f j, . . ., fb). Then, he has to make several modifications on function calls, among which the deletion of call( f j)
from function fi and the replacement of call( fi) with call( f j) in function fk, in order to remain the program P∗
functional. Such modification have very low probability to destroy the structure of the embedded watermark F [pi∗]
without breakdown the functionality of program P∗.
It is worth noting that any code modification which destroys the structure of F[pi∗] can be detected with high
probability by our model WaterRPG due to error-correcting properties of the watermark graph F [pi∗]. Finally, we
should point out that our model does not add any dead or dummy code in the watermarked program P∗ and also it
does not use any mark during the embedding process in order to locate and extract the watermark from P∗.
Code-resilience. Resiliency against code-attacks refers to the ability of a watermarking model to recognize a
watermark even after the program P∗ has been attacked or subjected to code transformations such as translation,
optimization and obfuscation [23]. The code-attacks take place when the attacker fails to detect the code of program
P∗ associated with our watermark F [pi∗]. In this case, the attacker broadly applies code transformation attacks in
the whole code of P∗ in order to reduce the ability of the model’s recognizer to extract the watermark.
Roughly speaking, the goal of an obfuscation attack is to make a model’s recognizer to hardly extract the
watermark from P∗. Our model watermarks an application program P in such a way that it withstands several ob-
fuscation attacks among which layout-obfuscation and data-obfuscation attacks. Indeed, the experiments showed
that the water-graph F [pi∗] can be efficiently extracted even the code of program P∗ has been subjected to control-
obfuscation attacks such as expression reordering or loop reordering; some of our experiments were performed
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with an automated tool (e.g., ProGuard). It is fair to mention that our model does not properly operate on some
other control obfuscation attacks such as aggregation including inline functions and outline functions; for example,
if an attacker split a function or merge functions of P∗ associated with the code of the watermark F [pi∗], he actually
makes a targeted attack both on vertices and edges of watermark graph F [pi∗] destroying thus the structure of F [pi∗].
As far as the optimization attacks are concerned we point out that they are mainly applied by a compiler or
interpreter into the executable program altering the generated traces of program P∗; note that our WaterRpg model
encodes execution trace watermarks. The embedded watermark F [pi∗] withstands on such attacks since any removal
of function calls, register reallocation, or information for debugging does not affect the structural properties of the
embedding graph F[pi∗]. Again, the experimental study showed that our WaterRPG withstands on a relatively large
subset of optimization attacks including semantic-preserving transformations, shrinking, and also it withstands on
the most time consuming operation namely language transformation (i.e., the attacker rewrites the whole code of
P∗ in another language).
A watermarking model must also be resilient against a reasonable set of de-compilation attacks. Thus, in our
experimental study, we also included the evaluation of our watermarking model WaterRPG against de-compilation
attacks. More precisely, we tested our programs with a revere engineering tool (e.g., Java Decompiler) and figure
out that in all the cases that WaterRPG successfully extracts the watermarking graph F[pi∗] from the watermarked
programs P∗N and P∗S ; indeed, in all the cases the dynamic call-graph G(P∗, Ikey) taken by the input Ikey were
isomorphic to graph F [pi∗].
6 Concluding Remarks
Through the evaluation of WaterRPG, we showed that our model has zero false positive and false negative rates
in the case where the watermarked code has not been attacked. Indeed, it is true because the execution of the
watermarked program P∗ with the secret input sequence always builds a call graph G(P∗, Ikey) which is isomorphic
with the water-graph F [pi∗].
The execution time and space overhead varies depending on the size of the embedded watermark; in fact, the
overhead increases linearly in the size of the water-graph F [pi∗]. It is worth noting that the data-rate is directly
correlated with the number of functions used or, equivalently, with the size of the water-graph. In the case where
the code (in bits) of the original program P is large enough, our model has high data-rate and extremely low
embedding overhead. We point out that the number of nodes of the water-graph F [pi∗] affects the number of
functions we use for embedding. Thus, it is possible to use fewer functions which would result in a graph F [pi∗]
with fewer nodes; note that, the graph F [pi∗] on n = 2k+1 nodes can encode a watermarking integer w in the range
[0,2k−1− 1]; see, authors’ work [4, 5].
Furthermore, in our model the code which is associated with the watermark is composed both by new code and
host code; this enable us to obtain high stealth watermarked programs P∗. Moreover, since the watermark code has
become an indispensable piece of the functionality of program P∗, a malicious user would need to fully understand
the operations of P∗ in order to intervene changing possible execution flows. On the other hand, the extraction
of our watermark takes into account and uses the traces of all the functions that are assigned to the nodes of the
water-graph F [pi∗] which, in turn, means that if a subset of these functions is intercepted then the watermark can
not be extracted; unfortunately, this implies a poor part protection of our watermarked program P∗.
Finally, the experimental results show the high functionality of all the Java programs P∗ watermarked under
both the naive and stealthy cases, and also their low time complexity. The experiments also show that the water-
marking approaches supported by our model can help develop efficient watermarked Java programs with respect
to various and broadly used performance and resilience watermarking criteria.
Closing, we note that in light of our dynamic watermarking model WaterRPG it would be very interesting to
compare it with other dynamic, or even static, already proposed software watermarking models [8, 10, 21, 24, 28];
we leave it as a direction for future work.
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